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Abstract—Several studies have developed metrics for software
quality attributes of object-oriented designs such as reusability
and functionality. However, metrics which measure the quality
attribute of information security have received little attention.
Moreover, existing security metrics measure either the system
from a high level (i.e. the whole system’s level) or from a low
level (i.e. the program code’s level). These approaches make it
hard and expensive to discover and fix vulnerabilities caused by
software design errors. In this work, we focus on the design of an
object-oriented application and define a number of information
security metrics derivable from a program’s design artifacts.
These metrics allow software designers to discover and fix
security vulnerabilities at an early stage, and help compare the
potential security of various alternative designs. In particular,
we present security metrics based on composition, coupling,
extensibility, inheritance, and the design size of a given object-
oriented, multi-class program from the point of view of potential
information flow.
Index Terms—Quality; Security; Metrics; Refactoring
I. INTRODUCTION
Many software quality attributes have been studied and
measured extensively including maintainability, performance,
reusability, and reliability [1]. Security, on the other hand, has
received relatively little attention. Furthermore, those security
measurements which have been defined either assess security
at the abstract system architecture level [2] or at the low level
of program code [3]. Measuring security at the design phase,
based on typical design artifacts, has not been considered
even though such metrics could have efficiently eliminated
software security vulnerabilities before they reach the finalised
product [4] [5]. Such metrics would also allow software
developers to compare the security level of various alternative
designs under consideration.
This paper proposes a new set of metrics which are capable
of assessing information-flow security of object-oriented de-
signs. In previous work, we developed seven security metrics
for assessing the security of a single object-oriented class [6].
These metrics measured Data Encapsulation and Cohesion for
a given class. Here we extend that work to consider entire
class hierarchies.
We define our metrics based on the quality properties for
object-oriented programs specified by Bansiya and Davis [1],
using five properties which are related to the overall design of
an object-oriented program: composition, coupling, extensibil-
ity, inheritance, and design size. Our metrics aim to measure
any potential information flow which could occur between
objects instantiated from the design’s classes.
However, in order to measure the impact of these properties
on information flow, we need security-annotated class dia-
grams. In our case, we use UMLsec and SPARK’s annotations
to identify confidential data [7] and to express the information
flow relations between attributes, methods, and classes of a
given design [8]. Once the metrics’ results are identified for
a number of alternative designs, it is then easy to choose the
most secure design.
II. RELATED WORK AND RESEARCH PROBLEM
Most current studies on software security admit that there
is no such thing as a completely secure program, but there are
nevertheless various ways of reducing security risks and vul-
nerabilities [9] [10]. A common approach to developing secure
programs is to enforce security at the implementation stage.
Several projects have investigated information flow through
computer program code, via type analysis [11], data/control-
flow analysis [12], and ways of identifying and eliminating
program code vulnerabilities [10] [13].
Chowdhury et al. [3] defined a number of security metrics
that assess the security of a given program based on code
inspections. However, their metrics require full system imple-
mentations to assess security which makes it impossible to fix
problems at design time.
Instead, the most efficient approach is to enforce security
at early phases of the software development lifecycle such
as during the design phase [4] [5]. The National Institute
of Standards and Technology [14] stated that eliminating
vulnerabilities in the design stage can cost 30 times less
than fixing them at a later stage. One of the earliest studies
in this area was the development of software security de-
sign principles by Saltzer and Schroeder [15]. Additionally,
Bishop’s [16] and Viega and McGraw’s [17] texts identify
several significant security design principles. However, these
principles are intended as guidance to help develop secure
systems, mainly operating systems, and are not capable of
quantifying the security levels of designs. Thus, there is a need
for security metrics which objectively measure the security of
a given program directly from its design artifacts.
A study that defined design metrics which measure certain
software quality attributes was conducted by Bansiya and
Davis [1]. They identified a Quality Model for Object-Oriented
Design (QMOOD) [1]. Their approach aims to measure the
quality of various object-oriented design attributes such as
reusability, flexibility, and functionality based on their rel-
evance to certain quality design properties (e.g. abstraction,
cohesion, and coupling). Even though the study covered most
design quality attributes, it did not consider security.
In general, studies which focus on ‘programming in the
small’ [18], i.e., at the level of individual program statements,
are not the most efficient approach to achieving software
security. In this paper, we instead extend our previously
defined design metrics which evaluate security based on a
single class diagram [6] to entire class hierarchies. We define
several new security metrics for a complete object oriented
design. They can be used to compare different designs for the
same program and identify the most secure one.
III. ASSUMPTIONS AND ANNOTATIONS
We have developed our security design metrics to be capable
of quantifying the security level of a given object-oriented
program based on its design quality properties (composition,
coupling, extensibility, inheritance, and design size). These
metrics are meant to be comparative rather than absolute mea-
sures. They can be used to compare various alternative designs
for the same program with respect to their security properties.
They are different from typical “code complexity” metrics,
which measure explicit syntactic properties of the code such
as the number of variables and lines of code. Instead, our
metrics measure (usually implicit) potential information flow
properties within a program design. They have been scaled
to all fit within the range 0 to 1 with lower values considered
desirable. The metrics can show which designs are more secure
by choosing the lowest values.
To apply our metrics to a given design, we assume that
system designers will provide annotated UML class diagrams
using UMLsec and SPARK’s annotations. UMLsec [7] is an
extension of the Unified Modeling Language which labels
objects as ‘critical’ if they contain data which can be of a
security risk at any point. It also associates a ‘secrecy’ tag
with data which needs to be kept confidential [7].
On the other hand, SPARK is a programming language for
security-critical code in which the programmer may annotate
subroutines with the intended data flow between variables
and parameters. The SPARK compiler then performs a data-
flow analysis to confirm that the code does indeed have the
characteristics the programmer intended. SPARK’s annotations
consist of a “derives x from Y” block which explains how
the value of a certain variable or return value x is poten-
tially derived from the value of other method parameters
or variables Y [8]. Our metrics assume the “derives from”
annotations identify the flow of data between methods and
classes.
To have consistent designs, we assume that a class is labeled
“critical” if and only if it contains classified attributes labeled
as “secrecy” or if it has an attribute which derives its value
from a classified attribute. Similarly, an attribute which derives
its value from a classified attribute or method parameter must
be labeled as “secrecy”.
IV. METRICS DEVELOPMENT AND DEFINITIONS
We developed our security metrics for object oriented
designs based on the analysis of software quality design
properties defined in the Quality Model for Object-Oriented
Design [1]. These properties include: composition, coupling,
extensibility, inheritance, and design size. We studied each
property and its relevance to designing secure software to
define our metrics so that if any security-critical attributes have
changed in a design then the relevant metrics will reflect this
change as well.
A. Composition
Aggregation and composition are extensively mentioned
in the context of object-oriented programming. Aggrega-
tion is an association between two or more system com-
ponents/objects [19]. It’s been described as a ‘whole-part
association’, where one object is the whole and the others
are the parts [19]. However, composition is a stronger type
of aggregation which has a ‘lifetime dependency’ between
composite objects and the whole object [19]. Therefore, delet-
ing the whole object would result in deleting the composite
ones [19]. In object-oriented programming, composition is
implemented through the use of inner/nested classes [20], by
implementing the composite whole class as the outer class and
the composite part class as the inner one. It is expected that
no other class would have access to the inner class directly,
therefore, access to inner classes is done by first having access
to the outer class [21].
However, this is not always true in program code since some
programming languages treat inner classes as independent
ones, and therefore allow direct access to them [21]. However,
at the design level, we assume this can’t occur and that
the design describes the intended implementation accurately.
Such implementation-dependent issues are beyond the scope
of design-time analyses.
Composition yields a weak possibility of potential infor-
mation flow for classified data when considering information
security. This risk has been identified in the field of software
security, and as a result it is recommended to avoid using
inner classes security-critical code [21]. However, in our case
we assume that using inner classes is secure since most
programming languages don’t allow external access to inner
classes, unless they are marked as public.
Figure 1 shows a class hierarchy which has deployed com-
position. The design includes two classified data attributes, δ
of type U and γ of type V, distributed among two classes: class
A (outer class) and class B (inner class). (We use Greek letters
in these examples to denote classified data.) Our composition
metric aims to increase the use of critical composite parts
which contain classified data similar to class B and limit
the use of composite whole classes similar to class A. This
will reduce potential information flow of classified data from
composite-whole to composite part classes.
1) Composite-Part Critical Classes (CPCC): This metric is
proportional to “The ratio of the number of critical composed-
part classes to the total number of critical classes in a design”.
Figure 1. Composition Class Hierarchy
It aims to reward the use of inner classes for holding classified
data, and penalise the use of outer classes for this purpose. We
assume that in order to access inner classes, it is essential to
access the outer class, and therefore no direct access can be
made to the inner class [21]. From this point of view, storing
private classified data in inner classes is a more secure solution
since this data has less chance to be exposed to the public.
Increasing the number of critical composed-part classes in a
design gives a lower value of this metric, and hence indicates
a more secure design.
Consider a set of critical classes in a design D as CC =
{cc1, ...,ccn} and the composed-part critical classes in the
same design as CP = {cp1, ...,cpn} such that CP ⊆ CC.
Then, we define the Composite-Part Critical Classes metric
as follows, where |S| is the size of set S.
CPCC (D) = 1−
(
|CP|
|CC|
)
B. Coupling
Coupling is one of the most important software design
properties. It is defined as the interaction degree an object
has with other objects, measured by the number of links it
has with these objects [19]. A number of metrics have been
defined to measure the coupling degree between classes of
an object-oriented program [22] [23]. A design time coupling
metric is defined by Bansiya and Davis [1] called Direct Class
Coupling (DCC). Their metric measures the number of other
classes that a certain class interacts with [1]. A system with
low coupling is considered a better design with regard to
reusability, understandability, and extensibility [1] [19].
The impact of coupling on security has been discussed by
Liu and Traore [24] in their study which shows a strong
correlation between coupling and a system’s attackability.
Systems with high coupling are a greater target for successful
attacks unlike systems with low coupling [24]. With regard to
security coupling metrics, a study conducted by Chowdhury
et al. [3] measures the security coupling between a program’s
methods based on code inspections, but our security coupling
metric can be applied based on the design of a given program
only.
1) Critical Classes Coupling (CCC): This metric aims to
find the degree of coupling between classes and classified
attributes in a given design. It is defined as “The ratio of
Figure 2. Coupling through Methods
Figure 3. Coupling through Attributes
the number of all classes’ links with classified attributes to
the total number of possible links with classified attributes
in a given design”. It is calculated based on the theory of
directed weighted links. In our context, a directed link shows
the classes which may reference or access certain classified
attributes in other classes. For each class that may access
a classified attribute (as indicated by one or more ‘derives
from’ annotations), we add a weight of one. To find the ratio
of the coupling, we need to first identify the sum of the
classified attributes’ accessing or referencing weights. Then,
we divide this number by the total number of links to all
classified attributes, which is the total number of classes, less
the classified attribute’s own class, times the total number of
classified attributes.
This metric aims to penalise programs with high coupling.
Therefore, it produces lower values for fewer interactions
between classes and classified attributes, and hence a lower
chance of potential flow of classified data.
Figure 2 illustrates the coupling we measure by this metric,
through the calling of methods in other classes which return
classified data. In this case, objects of class C call method M in
class B which returns the value of classified attribute δ . How-
ever, coupling through the use of public classified attributes as
in Figure 3 is not covered by this metric. This case is measured
by our single class metrics [6].
Consider a set of classes in a design D as Ci, i ∈ {1, . . . ,c}
and a set of classified attributes as CA j, j ∈ {1, . . . ,ca}, and
let α (CA j) be the number of classes which may interact with
classified attribute CA j. Then, the CCC metric for design D
can be expressed as follows.
CCC(D) =
∑
ca
j=1 α (CA j)
(|C|−1)×|CA|
C. Extensibility
Extensibility is the property which allows a certain class
or method to be extended by other classes or methods [19].
McGraw and Felten’s text [21] identifies twelve rules for
developing more secure Java code. One of these rules is
the necessity of preventing classes and methods from being
extended. The text mentions that extensibility is an enemy of
secure code, and therefore it is essential to make classes and
methods inextensible (finalised) unless there is a convincing
reason not to do so [21]. With regard to this security coding
Figure 4. Class Hierarchy with Extensibility
rule, we have identified two metrics which measure how it is
possible to extend the system’s classes, methods, and attributes
from a design diagram perspective. The metrics are divided
into two kinds: one measures the extensibility of critical
classes while the other measures the extensibility of classified
methods.
Figure 4 illustrates the concept of extensibility. It shows that
class E and method N in class B are not extensible. However,
other classes and methods could be extended such as class B
and method M in class A.
1) Critical Classes Extensibility (CCE): This metric is
defined as “The ratio of the number of the non-finalised
critical classes in a design to the total number of critical
classes in that design”. Since extensible critical classes could
allow other classes to have access to their classified data,
their presence increases the ‘attack surface’ size [25]. Making
critical classes inextensible eliminates this risk, and hence
reduces the possibility of information flow from these classes,
so the CCE metric penalises designs with extendible critical
classes, such as classes A and B in Figure 4. Considering the
design in Figure 4, the CCE metric would give us a value of
two non-finalised critical classes, i.e. class A and B, over three
critical classes in that design.
Consider a set of classes in a design D as CC =
{cc1, . . . ,ccn} and extensible critical classes in the same design
as ECC = {ecc1, . . . ,eccn} such that ECC ⊆ CC. Then, we
define the Critical Classes Extensibility metric as follows.
CCE(D) =
|ECC|
|CC|
2) Classified Methods Extensibility (CME): This metric
measures the proportion of non-finalised classified methods
which can be extended against the total number of classified
methods in a design. We define it as “The ratio of the number
of the non-finalised classified methods in a design to the total
number of classified methods in that design”. Non-finalised
methods allow other methods in other classes to override them.
This is a security risk if such methods are classified. This
can be avoided by declaring classified methods as inextensible
(final), and hence the risk of losing control over classified data
can be reduced. Therefore, this metric rewards designs with
inextensible classified methods, similar to method N in class
B from Figure 4.
To apply the CME metric to Figure 4, we get two non-
finalised classified methods, i.e. method M in classes A and B
respectively over three classified methods in the whole design
which means two thirds of the classified methods in the design
are not finalised.
Consider a set of classified methods in a design D as CM =
{cm1, . . . ,cmn} and extensible classified methods in the same
design as ECM = {ecm1, . . . ,ecmn} such that ECM ⊆ CM.
Then, we define the Classified Methods Extensibility metric
as follows.
CME(D) =
|ECM|
|CM|
D. Inheritance
Inheritance is an object-oriented mechanism which allows
programmers to provide classes with generalisation and spe-
cialisation relationships [19]. Subclasses in an inheritance hier-
archy automatically obtain features of their superclasses [19].
The work of Lorenz and Kidd [26] in 1994 aimed to measure
inheritance via the number of inherited methods, number
of overridden methods, and number of new methods in a
class [26]. Bansiya and Davis [1] defined inheritance as the
degree of reuse, measured by finding the ratio of the number
of methods inherited by a class to the total number of methods
accessed by member methods of the class.
Both of these sets of metrics can be measured from a design
perspective. However, measuring how inheritance could have
an impact on security has not been discussed previously. From
the security point of view, inheritance could allow subclasses
to acquire privileges over classified data in superclasses, which
increases the chance of potential classified information flow.
As a result, we have grouped our metrics into four types which
cover various kinds of information flow in an inhertiance
hierarchy.
We illustrate these metrics with regard to Figure 5 which
shows a class diagram with inherited classified data. Classes
A, B, and E are superclasses, and therefore their public and
protected attributes and methods, such as protected method N
in class B, can be inherited by their subclasses, i.e. classes F,
G, and I. However, attributes declared as private in a superclass
cannot be inherited such as classified attributes δ and γ in
classes A and B respectively.
1) Critical Superclasses Proportion (CSP): This inheri-
tance metric measures the proportion of critical superclasses
in an inheritance hierarchy. It is defined as “The ratio of the
number of critical superclasses to the total number of critical
classes in an inheritance hierarchy”. The metric identifies the
proportion of critical classes that contain classified data which
could be accessed by subclasses. It rewards a lower overall
proportion of critical superclasses in a design, and penalises
use of critical superclasses. In Figure 5 there are two critical
Figure 5. Class Hierarchy with Inheritance
superclasses, i.e. classes A and B, compared to four critical
classes in the whole hierarchy.
Consider a set of critical classes in hierarchy H as CC =
{cc1, . . . ,ccn} and critical superclasses in the same hierarchy
as CSC = {csc1, . . . ,cscn} such that CSC ⊆ CC. Then, we
define the Critical Superclasses Proportion as follows.
CSP(H) =
|CSC|
|CC|
2) Critical Superclasses Inheritance (CSI): This metric
is defined as “The ratio of the sum of classes which may
inherit from each critical superclass to the number of possible
inheritances from all critical classes in a class hierarchy”. The
number of possible inheritances from critical classes is the
product of the number of classes less one times the number
of critical classes in the class hierarchy. This metric penalises
class hierarchies in which critical classes appear near the top,
and rewards those in which critical classes appear near the
bottom. Lower values of this metric indicate that fewer classes
may inherit from each critical superclass, and hence there is
a less chance of information flow to subclasses. This also
means that critical superclasses are towards the bottom of the
hierarchy, so these classes are easier to secure [25] because
they can have fewer inhertiting subclasses. In Figure 5, the
classes which may inherit from critical superclasses A and
B are classes B, E, F, and G. If we apply the CSI metric
to Figure 5, the value of this metric is calculated as follows.
The number of classes which may inherit from each critical
superclass is six, i.e. 5 can inherit from class A and 1 can
inherit from class B. The total number of possible inheritances
from all critical classes in Figure 5 is twenty, i.e. for each
of the 4 critical classes, there are 5 other classes that could
potentially inherit from it.
Consider a set of classes in hierarchy H as Ci, i∈ {1, . . . ,c},
a set of critical classes in the same hierarchy as CC j, j ∈
{1, . . . ,cc}, and a set of critical superclasses in the same
hierarchy as CSCk, k ∈ {1, . . . ,csc} where CSC ⊆ CC and
CC ⊆C. Let β (CSCk) be be the number of classes which may
inherit from the critical superclass CSCk. Then, the Critical
Superclasses Inheritance metric for hierarchy H is defined as
follows.
CSI(H) =
∑
csc
k=1 β (CSCk)
(|C|−1)×|CC|
3) Classified Methods Inheritance (CMI): This metric is
defined as “The ratio of the number of classified methods
which can be inherited in a hierarchy to the total number of
classified methods in that hierarchy”. It measures the propor-
tion of classified methods which are exposed to inheritance by
other classes. Hierarchies with lower values of CMI have fewer
classified methods that are exposed to inheritance, and thus
represent a more secure system. Figure 5 shows a classified
method N in class B which is inheritable. The CMI metric
measures this type of method and penalises their use in a multi-
class design. By contrast, Figure 5 has another inheritable
classified method M in class I. However, this method is not
counted by this metric since the enclosing class I is not a
superclass.
Consider a set of classified methods in hierarchy H as
CM = {cm1, . . . ,cmn} and the classified methods which could
be inherited in the same hierarchy as MI = {mi1, . . . ,min}
such that MI ⊆CM. Then, we define the Classified Methods
Inheritance metric as follows.
CMI(H) =
|MI|
|CM|
4) Classified Attributes Inheritance (CAI): We define this
metric as “The ratio of the number of classified attributes
which can be inherited in a hierarchy to the total number of
classified attributes in that hierarchy”. It measures the propor-
tion of classified attributes which are exposed to inheritance
by other classes. Similar to the CMI metric, CAI aims to
show that hierarchies with lower values of CAI have fewer
classified attributes exposed to inheritance, and thus produce
a more secure system. This metric can be illustrated using the
classified attributes in Figure 5. Attribute ε in B is inheritable
and is counted by this metric. However, attribute ζ in class F is
not inheritable in this design since class F is not a superclass.
Therefore, it is not counted.
Consider a set of classified attributes in hierarchy H as
CA = {ca1, . . . ,can} and the classified attributes which could
be inherited in the same hierarchy as AI = {ai1, . . . ,ain}
such that AI ⊆CA. Then, we define the Classified Attributes
Inheritance metric as follows.
CAI(H) =
|AI|
|CA|
E. Design Size
Design size measures the number of classes in a design [1].
A metric for measuring design size in object-oriented designs
defined by Bansiya and Davis [1] is called Design Size
in Classes (DSC). DSC is a count of the total number of
classes in a certain design [1]. Bansiya and Davis’ study also
revealed that design size has a major impact on a program’s
reusability and functionality [1]. With respect to security, the
Name
- firstName : String
- lastName : String
+ Name(_firstName : String ,  _lastName : String)
+ GetName() : String
Administrator
- name : Name
- jobTitle : String
+ Administrator(_name : Name ,  _jobTitle : String)
+ GetName() : Name
+ SetJobTitle(_jobTitle : String) : Void
+ GetJobTitle() : String
«Critical»
Agent
- name : Name
- «secrecy» jobTitle : String
- «secrecy» clearance : Clearance
+ Agent(_name : Name ,  _jobTitle : String , _clearance : Clearance)
[derives name.firstName, name.lastName, jobTitle, clearance.level, 
 clearance.number from _name, _jobTitle, _clearance]
+ GetName() : Name
[derives GetName() from name.firstName, name.lastName]
+ SetJobTitle(_jobTitle : String) : Void
[derives jobTitle from _jobTitle]
+ GetJobTitle() : String
[derives GetJobTitle() from jobTitle]
+ SetClearance(_clearance : Clearance) : Void
[derives clearance.level, clearance.number from _clearance]
+ GetClearance() : Clearance
[derives GetClearance() from clearance.level, clearance.number]
«Critical»
Clearance
- «secrecy» level : String
- «secrecy» number : Integer
+ SetLevel(_level : String) : Void
[derives level from _level]
+ SetNumber(_number : Integer) : Void
[derives number from _number]
+ GetClearance() : String
[derives GetClearance() from level, number]
Figure 6. Defence System Original Class Hierarchy
size of object-oriented designs, to our knowledge, has not been
utilised. Nevertheless, Chowdhury et al.’s study [3] defines
a metric which measures the ratio of critical elements in a
specific program’s code. This metric requires the system to be
fully implemented in order to calculate such a ratio.
1) Critical Design Proportion (CDP): This metric mea-
sures the impact of the size of a certain design on security. We
define it as “The ratio of number of critical classes to the total
number of classes in a design”. It measures the proportion
of classes which store classified data, i.e. critical classes. A
higher proportion of critical classes in a design indicates higher
security risks for potential information flow. Designs with
lower values of CDP indicate fewer critical classes compared
to other designs of the same size, and hence more secure
systems [16].
Consider a set of classes in design D as C = {c1, . . . ,cn} and
the critical classes in the same design as CC = {cc1, . . . ,ccn}
such that CC ⊆ C. Then, we define the Critical Design Pro-
portion metric as follows.
CDP(D) =
|CC|
|C|
V. METRICS CASE STUDY
The following case study illustrates how our software se-
curity design metrics are used. They can be applied once
a complete UML class diagram, or similar, is constructed
for a given system. Like our single class security metrics
case study [6], this class diagram must include UMLsec and
SPARK’s annotations in addition to the standard elements of
a class diagram.
A. Annotated UML Class Diagrams
This section shows an annotated class diagram for a planned
computer program for the Department of Defence. The class
diagram in Figure 6 has been annotated using UMLsec and
SPARK’s annotations. The UMLsec annotations show the
data which needs to be kept confidential while SPARK’s
annotations identify how data flows between the program’s
classes, attributes, and methods. The defence system class is
responsible for storing information about a person working
within the Department of Defence. This person can be either
an agent or an administrator. The Agent class is responsible for
storing an agent’s information. This includes the agent’s name,
job title, security clearance level and number. We assume
that the security clearance level and number are codes which
describe the security classification for a given agent. Details
of an agent’s job title and security clearance are meant to be
kept secret.
The Administrator class is responsible for storing informa-
tion about an administrator. This information consists of the
administrator’s name and job title. Unlike the Agent class,
the Administrator class does not contain any confidential data.
Both the Agent and Administrator classes use the same Name
class.
B. Refactored UML Class Diagrams
In this section we illustrate the capabilities of our metrics
by applying them first to the original design of the defence
system, and then to three refactored versions of the original
design using one or more of the refactoring rules defined by
Fowler [27]. (These additional designs omit the “derives from”
annotations for brevity.)
For instance, Figure 7 shows a design which has been
constructed after applying a number of refactoring steps to
the original one. It differs from the original design in the
number of classes. The system now has three classes instead
of four, thanks to the refactoring rule Inline Class which has
been applied to the original design through the merging of the
Clearance and Agent classes. All the attributes and methods
of the Clearance class have been moved to the Agent class by
applying this rule.
Name
- firstName : String
- lastName : String
+ Name(_firstName : String ,  _lastName : String) 
+ GetName() : String
Administrator
- name : Name
- jobTitle : String
+ Administrator(_name : Name ,  _jobTitle : String)
+ GetName() : Name
+ SetJobTitle(_jobTitle : String) : void
+ GetJobTitle() : String
«Critical»
Agent
- name : Name
- «secrecy» jobTitle : String
- «secrecy» clearanceLevel : String
- «secrecy» clearanceNumber : Integer
+ Agent(_name : Name ,  _jobTitle : String , _cLevel : String , _cNumber : Integer)
+ GetName() : Name
+ SetJobTitle(_jobTitle : String) : void
+ GetJobTitle() : String
+ SetClearanceLevel(_level : String) : void
+ SetClearanceNumber(_number : Integer) : void
+ GetClearance() : String
Figure 7. Defence 2 Class Hierarchy
Another refactored design is shown in Figure 8. It keeps
the Clearance class but since the Agent and Administrator
classes have similar features, it has used inheritance. To do this
we applied the following refactoring rules: Extract Superclass,
Pull up Field, and Pull up Method. Extract Superclass was
used to combine similar attributes and methods in the Agent
and Administrator classes by creating a superclass called Staff.
The Pull up Field and Pull up Method refactoring rules were
used to move the same fields and methods from both classes
to the superclass. These fields are name and jobTitle, while
the methods are GetName, SetJobTitle, and GetJobTitle. The
only exception is keeping the Administrator job title field in its
original class since it is not confidential and it can be exposed
to the public.
Figure 9 also used the Extract Superclass refactoring rule to
separate a new class from the Administrator and Agent classes
called Staff. Then it has used the Inline Class refactoring rule
to combine the Clearance and Agent classes. It then used the
Inline Class refactoring rule to combine the Staff and Name
classes. Figure 9 has also labelled the critical class Agent,
which contains classified attributes and methods, as ‘final’ to
indicate that this class can’t be extended.
«Critical»
Clearance
- «secrecy» level : String
- «secrecy» number : Integer
+ SetLevel(_level : String) : void
+ SetNumber(_number : Integer) : void
+ GetClearance() : String
«Critical»
Staff
# name : Name
# «secrecy» jobTitle : String
+ Staff(_name: Name , _jobTitle : String) 
+ GetName() : String
+ SetJobTitle(_jobTitle : String) : void
+ GetJobTitle() : String
Name
- firstName : String
- lastName : String
+ Name(_firstName : String ,  _lastName : String) 
+ GetName() : String
«Critical»
Agent
- «secrecy» clearance : Clearance
+ SetClearance(_clearance : Clearance) : void
+ GetClearance() : Clearance
Administrator
- jobTitle : String
+ SetJobTitle(_jobTitle : String) : void
+ GetJobTitle() : String
Figure 8. Defence 3 Class Hierarchy
Administrator
- jobTitle : String
+ SetJobTitle(_jobTitle : String) : void
+ GetJobTitle() : String
Staff
# firstName : String
# lastName : String
+ Staff(_firstName: String , _lastName : String) 
+ GetName() : String
«Critical» «Final»
Agent
- «secrecy» jobTitle : String
- «secrecy» level : String
- «secrecy» number : Integer
+ SetJobTitle(_jobTitle : String) : void
+ GetJobTitle() : String
+ SetLevel(_level : String) : void
+ SetNumber(_number : Integer) : void
+ GetClearance() : String
Figure 9. Defence 4 Class Hierarchy
C. Security Metrics Results
Table 1 shows the results of applying our metrics to the four
designs shown in Figures 6 to 9. For instance, to calculate
the CPCC metric for Designs 1 and 2, we have to find
Table I
SOFTWARE SECURITY METRICS RESULTS
Metric Name Defence 1 Defence 2 Defence 3 Defence 4
CPCC 0.50 1 0.67 1
CCC 0.17 0 0.125 0
CCE 1 1 1 0
CME 1 1 1 0
CSP 0 0 0.50 0
CSI 0 0 0.50 0
CMI 0 0 0.60 0
CAI 0 0 0.50 0
CDP 0.50 0.33 0.60 0.33
0
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1
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CCE
CME
CSPCSI
CMI
CAI
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Figure 13. Metrics for Defence 4
out the number of critical composed-part classes and the
total number of critical classes in both designs. This is one
critical-composed part class for Design 1 while Design 2 has
none. In addition, there are two critical classes in Design 1
while Design 2 has only one. According to the definition of
the CPCC metric, we have to divide the number of critical
composed-part classes by the total number of critical classes
for each design to get its result.
The CCC metric counts the number of interactions with each
classified attribute and divides it by the maximum number of
possible interactions with these attributes. This number can be
calculated by multiplying the number of the design’s classes
less one by the number of classified attributes. In the case
of Design 3, which has four classified attributes, the actual
number of interactions with these attributes is two while the
number of possible interactions is sixteen. Dividing these two
numbers gives us 0.125 in this case.
Additionally, Design 3 has the highest ratio of critical
classes compared to other designs, so this design has the
highest value of the CDP metric which is calculated by diving
the number of critical classes in a design by the total number
of classes in that design.
To calculate the CSP metric for Design 3, we first need
the number of critical superclasses in all of the inheritance
hierarchy, which is one. Then, this number is divided by the
number of critical classes in the hierarchies, which is three.
The CSI metric is calculated by first counting the number of
classes which may inherit each critical superclass, which is two
in Design 3. Then, we divide this number by the maximum
number of classes which could possibly inherit from these
critical superclasses, which is four in Design 3.
The CMI metric is calculated by counting the number
of inheritable classified methods in all of the inheritance
hierarchy, which is three in Design 3 divided by the number
of classified methods in that hierarchy, which is five.
The CAI metric is computed by dividing the number of in-
heritable classified attributes in all of the inheritance hierarchy,
which is one in Design 3 by the number of classified attributes
in that hierarchy, which is two.
The CCE metric is calculated by counting the number of
extensible critical classes, which is zero in Design 4, and then
dividing that by the total number of critical classes.
Finally, the CME metric is calculated by counting the
number of extensible classified methods, which is also zero in
Design 4 and then diving that by the total number of classified
methods. If the class is labelled as ‘final’ this means that it is
not extensible and also means that all of its methods are final
and not extensible even though they are not labelled as final.
An easy way of comparing the results of these metrics is
to show them on radar charts (Figures 10 to 13). Given that
our metrics are designed so that lower values are considered
more secure, graphs which are closer to the centre of the charts
indicate greater security. It can be seen that Design 4 shows
the lowest values for all metrics compared to the other designs
except for the CPCC metric, so we could say that this design
has yielded the most secure design for all properties except
composition. Designs which use composition in the same way
have shown the same results. Designs 2 and 4 show the highest
values for the CPCC metric. Therefore, these designs are the
most insecure designs for composition. However, Design 1 is
the most secure design with regard to the CPCC metric since
it has the lowest ratio of critical composed-part classes.
With regard to the design property of coupling, Design 1
shows the least secure design since it has the highest value
among the other designs for the CCC metric. This is because
it has the highest number of links with classified attributes. By
contrast, Design 2 and 4 are the most secure with regard to
coupling. This is because Design 2 doesn’t have any inter-class
references or links with classified attributes while Design 4
has replaced the traditional association between classes with
inheritance.
With regard to extensibility, the only design which has
declared all of its critical classes as ‘final’ is Design 4, which
finalises all of its methods. This has resulted in this design
being the most secure with regard to both the CCE and CME
metrics. The other designs have yielded identical results since
none have finalised any of their critical classes or classified
methods.
With regard to inheritance, Design 4 has shown the lowest
values for all of the inheritance metrics similarly to Designs 1
and 2 which have not used inheritance. Design 4 has used
inheritance in a way such that there exists neither critical
superclasses nor classified attributes or methods which could
be inherited. Therefore, Designs 1, 2 and 4 are the most secure
designs in this regard with a preference for Design 4 over the
others since it has used inheritance in a secure way. On the
other hand, Design 3 has shown the highest results, and hence
the least secure design, in terms of all inhertiance metrics.
With regard to the design size property, Designs 2 and 4
have the lowest ratio of critical classes compared to the total
number of classes as the CDP metric shows. Thus, they are
the most secure designs for this property. On the other hand,
Design 3 is the least secure design for this property since its
CDP metric reveals the highest ratio of critical classes in this
design.
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this work, we have defined a suite of security metrics
applicable to the entire design of a multi-class object-oriented
system. This suite has covered a number of software design
quality properties consisting of: composition, coupling, exten-
sibility, inheritance, and design size. They provide software de-
signers with a simple approach for identifying where security
vulnerabilities might occur from the perspective of information
flow of confidential data, and thus with the ability to compare
the security of various designs.
In principle, the metrics could be calculated automati-
cally by a UML tool once the design is augmented with
UMLsec’s annotations (which identify the confidential data)
and SPARK¹s annotations (which show how data flows within
the program). Instead, however, we are developing a tool to
automatically calculate these metrics from program code, to
allow us to assess their usefulness on existing large-scale
systems. This approach has the advantage of allowing the
“derives from” relationships to be determined automatically.
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